1.0 Introduction
This campaign will be played
using the Chain of Command rules produced by Too Fat Lardies. Please be aware
this campaign is in no way to politicise or lay blame on any participant. This
campaign serves the purpose of allowing gamers to explore this part of WW2 history
and reflect upon the events.
1.1 Opening Narrative
The campaign is set on the Greek island of Cephalonia
between 15 and 22 September 1943.
Since the fall of Greece to the Axis Powers in 1941, the
country had been divided into occupation zones, with the Italians retaining the
bulk of the mainland and majority of islands. The 33rd Infantry
Division Acqui, which had taken part in fighting against the French and Greeks
in 1940, were ordered to occupy the islands of Corfu, Lefkada, Zakynthos and
Cephalonia.
With the collapse of the Italian state in mid-1943, the
Germans set about reinforcing their presence throughout southern Europe. On 6
July 1943 Lt Colonel Johannes Barge arrived on the Ionian Islands with a
relatively small force of 2 000 men of the 966th Fortress Grenadier
Regiment including a battery of self-propelled guns and nine tanks.
With Italy’s armistice with the Allies in early September
1943 confusion reigned over the Italian Armed Forces located in all theatres.
Technically now on neither side in the war, the Germans wanted the
strategically important land and supplies held by their former ally. The
Allies, not wanting these assets to fall into German hands easily (or at all)
wanted the Italians to resist. With Italian troops spread across numerous
theatres and the chaos happening back in Italy, clear orders for commanders
were hard to come by – in many cases, after trying to clarify with commanding
officers, whole units, battalions, divisions either resisted the Germans,
collaborated with them or lay down their arms.
General Antonio Gandin, the commander of the 33rd
Infantry Division Acqui and a veteran of the Russian Front where he earned the
Iron Cross, found himself in this dilemma: surrender to the Germans (who were
already prepared and had begun disarming Italian garrisons elsewhere) or try to
resist.
On 8 September 1943, the day the armistice was made public,
General Carlo Vecchiarelli, commander of the Greece occupation force,
telegrammed Gandin his order, essentially a copy of the orders he received from
Rome – If the Germans do not attack the
Italians, the Italians should not attack the Germans and the Italians should
not ‘make common cause’ with the Greek partisans or even the Allies, should
they arrive in Cephalonia. In case of a German attack, Vecchiarelli’s
orders were not specific due to General Pietro Badoglio’s directed which stated
that the Italians should respond ‘with
“maximum decision” to any threat from any side’. In practice this order
implied that all Italian troops should defend themselves but did not explicitly
state so. At 22:30 hours of the same day Gandin received orders directly from
the Chief of Staff of the Italian Armed Forces, General Vittorio Ambrosio, to
send most of his naval and merchant vessels to Brindisi (Italy) immediately, as
demanded by the terms of the armistice. Gandin complied, thus losing a means of
escape.
To make matters even more complicated General Badoglio had
agreed, after the overthrow of Benito Mussolini and Badoglio becoming the new
Italian leader, to the unification of Gandin’s and Vechiarelli’s force under
German command, in order to appease the Germans. Therefore, technically, both
Italian commanders in Greece were under German command, even though Italy had
implemented an armistice agreement with the Allies. This order gave the Germans
a sense of justication in treating any Italians disobeying their orders as
mutineers which, at the time, was punishable by execution on capture. This
order also meant that the allies suspected that the troops under Gandin and
Vechiarelli’s command would at best give up their positions and supplies to the
Germans without a fight or, at worst, collaborate fully with them.
On 9 September 1943, Lt Colonel Barge met with Gandin and
misled him by stating that he had received no orders from German command. Barge
and Gandin liked each other, with shared interests in the works of Goethe and
Gandin being pro-German. Gandin’s German sympathies was the reason he was in
Greece to begin with, as General Ambrosio feared that he would try to resist
the plot to overthrown Mussolini. Both Barge and Gandin left the meeting on
good terms and agreeing to wait for orders and to resolve the situation
peacefully.
On 11 September 1943 the Italian High Command sent two
explicit instructions to Gandin – ‘German
troops have to be viewed as hostile’ and that ‘disarmament attempts by German forces must be resisted with weapons’.
On the same day Barge handed Gandin an ultimatum: continue fighting with the Germans, fight against the Germans or hand
over arms peacefully. Gandin brought Barge’s ultimatum to his senior
officers and the seven chaplains of the Division for discussion. Six chaplains
and all of his senior officers advised him to comply with the one of the two
favourable German demands while the remaining chaplain suggested immediate
surrender. However, Gandin knew that he could not agree to join the Germans
because that would be against High Commands and therefore the King of Italy’s
orders. Gandin did not want to fight the Germans as he could not bear to fight
against his previous brothers in arms. The final option of handing over his
arms would violate the spirit of the armistice.To buy himself more time Gandin
finally agreed to withdraw his soldiers from the strategic Mount Kardakata, in
return for a German promise not to bring reinforcements from the Greek
mainland.
On 12 September 1943 Gandin informed Barge that he was
prepared to surrender the Acqui’s weapons which Barge reported to his superiors
in the XXII Gebirgsjager Corps. As this occurred Gandin came under pressure
from his junior officers, who threatened mutiny, if an agreement was sought
with the Germans. The Acqui Division’s detachment on Corfu, not commanded by
Gandin, also informed Gandin late on 12 September by radio that they had
rejected an agreement with the Germans. Gandin also began to hear, from credible
sources, that soldiers who had surrendered to the Germans in other parts of
Greece were being deported rather than repatriated.
On 13 September 1943 a German convoy approached the
Cephalonia’s capital, Argostoli. Italian artillery officers, on their own
initiative, ordered the remaining batteries to open fire, resulting in two
German landing craft and five Germans dead. Under these circumstances, Gandin
presented his troops with a poll, essentially containing the three options
presented to him by Barge: Join the German, Surrender and be repatriated or
resist. The majority of the troops opted for the third option and therefore on
14 September 1943 Gandin reneged on the agreement he made with Barge. Gandin
refused to surrender anything but the division’s heavy artillery and telling
the Germans to leave the island, demanding a reply by 14 September at 9am. No
reply was received, with the Germans opting to draw out negotiations.
As the negotiations stalled, the Germans prepared to resolve
the crisis by force and presented the Italians with an ultimatum which expired
at 2pm on 15 September. On the morning of 15 September, the German Luftwaffe
began bombarding Italian positions with Stuka dive-bombers. These series of
events ensured that the Italian and German forces were now in full armed
resistance against one another.
Thanks for posting this David!
ReplyDeleteMost intesting topic.
I have no Italian figures but have a friend who does will talk to him about your well set out campaign!
Thanks for taking the time to read and comment Captain Darling!
DeleteIf you do get a chance to play through the campaign please let me know how it goes (either here or on the Chain of Command Forums). I hope you have as much fun playing it as I had researching and designing it.
Should you have any questions please let me know.