Massacre of the Acqui - Scooner size campaign for Chain of Command - Part 1 (Introduction)

1.0 Introduction

This campaign will be played using the Chain of Command rules produced by Too Fat Lardies. Please be aware this campaign is in no way to politicise or lay blame on any participant. This campaign serves the purpose of allowing gamers to explore this part of WW2 history and reflect upon the events.

1.1 Opening Narrative

The campaign is set on the Greek island of Cephalonia between 15 and 22 September 1943.

Since the fall of Greece to the Axis Powers in 1941, the country had been divided into occupation zones, with the Italians retaining the bulk of the mainland and majority of islands. The 33^rd Infantry Division Acqui, which had taken part in fighting against the French and Greeks in 1940, were ordered to occupy the islands of Corfu, Lefkada, Zakynthos and Cephalonia.

With the collapse of the Italian state in mid-1943, the Germans set about reinforcing their presence throughout southern Europe. On 6 July 1943 Lt Colonel Johannes Barge arrived on the Ionian Islands with a relatively small force of 2 000 men of the 966^th Fortress Grenadier Regiment including a battery of self-propelled guns and nine tanks.

With Italy’s armistice with the Allies in early September 1943 confusion reigned over the Italian Armed Forces located in all theatres. Technically now on neither side in the war, the Germans wanted the strategically important land and supplies held by their former ally. The Allies, not wanting these assets to fall into German hands easily (or at all) wanted the Italians to resist. With Italian troops spread across numerous theatres and the chaos happening back in Italy, clear orders for commanders were hard to come by – in many cases, after trying to clarify with commanding officers, whole units, battalions, divisions either resisted the Germans, collaborated with them or lay down their arms.

General Antonio Gandin, the commander of the 33^rd Infantry Division Acqui and a veteran of the Russian Front where he earned the Iron Cross, found himself in this dilemma: surrender to the Germans (who were already prepared and had begun disarming Italian garrisons elsewhere) or try to resist.

On 8 September 1943, the day the armistice was made public, General Carlo Vecchiarelli, commander of the Greece occupation force, telegrammed Gandin his order, essentially a copy of the orders he received from Rome – If the Germans do not attack the Italians, the Italians should not attack the Germans and the Italians should not ‘make common cause’ with the Greek partisans or even the Allies, should they arrive in Cephalonia. In case of a German attack, Vecchiarelli’s orders were not specific due to General Pietro Badoglio’s directed which stated that the Italians should respond ‘with “maximum decision” to any threat from any side’. In practice this order implied that all Italian troops should defend themselves but did not explicitly state so. At 22:30 hours of the same day Gandin received orders directly from the Chief of Staff of the Italian Armed Forces, General Vittorio Ambrosio, to send most of his naval and merchant vessels to Brindisi (Italy) immediately, as demanded by the terms of the armistice. Gandin complied, thus losing a means of escape.

To make matters even more complicated General Badoglio had agreed, after the overthrow of Benito Mussolini and Badoglio becoming the new Italian leader, to the unification of Gandin’s and Vechiarelli’s force under German command, in order to appease the Germans. Therefore, technically, both Italian commanders in Greece were under German command, even though Italy had implemented an armistice agreement with the Allies. This order gave the Germans a sense of justication in treating any Italians disobeying their orders as mutineers which, at the time, was punishable by execution on capture. This order also meant that the allies suspected that the troops under Gandin and Vechiarelli’s command would at best give up their positions and supplies to the Germans without a fight or, at worst, collaborate fully with them.

On 9 September 1943, Lt Colonel Barge met with Gandin and misled him by stating that he had received no orders from German command. Barge and Gandin liked each other, with shared interests in the works of Goethe and Gandin being pro-German. Gandin’s German sympathies was the reason he was in Greece to begin with, as General Ambrosio feared that he would try to resist the plot to overthrown Mussolini. Both Barge and Gandin left the meeting on good terms and agreeing to wait for orders and to resolve the situation peacefully.

On 11 September 1943 the Italian High Command sent two explicit instructions to Gandin – ‘German troops have to be viewed as hostile’ and that ‘disarmament attempts by German forces must be resisted with weapons’. On the same day Barge handed Gandin an ultimatum: continue fighting with the Germans, fight against the Germans or hand over arms peacefully. Gandin brought Barge’s ultimatum to his senior officers and the seven chaplains of the Division for discussion. Six chaplains and all of his senior officers advised him to comply with the one of the two favourable German demands while the remaining chaplain suggested immediate surrender. However, Gandin knew that he could not agree to join the Germans because that would be against High Commands and therefore the King of Italy’s orders. Gandin did not want to fight the Germans as he could not bear to fight against his previous brothers in arms. The final option of handing over his arms would violate the spirit of the armistice.To buy himself more time Gandin finally agreed to withdraw his soldiers from the strategic Mount Kardakata, in return for a German promise not to bring reinforcements from the Greek mainland.

On 12 September 1943 Gandin informed Barge that he was prepared to surrender the Acqui’s weapons which Barge reported to his superiors in the XXII Gebirgsjager Corps. As this occurred Gandin came under pressure from his junior officers, who threatened mutiny, if an agreement was sought with the Germans. The Acqui Division’s detachment on Corfu, not commanded by Gandin, also informed Gandin late on 12 September by radio that they had rejected an agreement with the Germans. Gandin also began to hear, from credible sources, that soldiers who had surrendered to the Germans in other parts of Greece were being deported rather than repatriated.

On 13 September 1943 a German convoy approached the Cephalonia’s capital, Argostoli. Italian artillery officers, on their own initiative, ordered the remaining batteries to open fire, resulting in two German landing craft and five Germans dead. Under these circumstances, Gandin presented his troops with a poll, essentially containing the three options presented to him by Barge: Join the German, Surrender and be repatriated or resist. The majority of the troops opted for the third option and therefore on 14 September 1943 Gandin reneged on the agreement he made with Barge. Gandin refused to surrender anything but the division’s heavy artillery and telling the Germans to leave the island, demanding a reply by 14 September at 9am. No reply was received, with the Germans opting to draw out negotiations.

As the negotiations stalled, the Germans prepared to resolve the crisis by force and presented the Italians with an ultimatum which expired at 2pm on 15 September. On the morning of 15 September, the German Luftwaffe began bombarding Italian positions with Stuka dive-bombers. These series of events ensured that the Italian and German forces were now in full armed resistance against one another.